Indonesians, like the Burmese and Indians, were widely sympathetic to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam’s (DRV) struggle for national independence. However, the DRV’s communist core posed problems for these non-communist states, especially Indonesian Republicans who were often at odds with communists in their own ranks or fearful of being labelled communists by the Dutch or the United States. As Indonesian statesman Sutan Sjahrir put it privately in late 1945 concerning his reluctance to respond to early Vietnamese calls to create an anti-colonial Southeast Asian bloc: “Ho Chi Minh is facing the French who will resist him for a very long time. Ho is also dependent on the support of the Communists, who are very powerful in the independence movement, which is not the case with us […] If we ally ourselves with Ho Chi Minh, we will weaken ourselves and delay independence”. Moreover, whereas Vietnamese communists would attack their non-communist nationalist competitors in Vietnam in 1946, forcing them to work with the French, the Indonesian Republicans smashed their communist competitors in 1948 during the Madiun revolt. Two very different postcolonial states and outcomes were thus at work.
The arrival of the Cold War in full force in 1950 put the Indonesians in a difficult position, as the West pressured them to recognize the Associated State of Vietnam led by Bao Dai instead of the DRV (which had been recognized by the communist bloc in January 1950). In March 1950, Prime Minister Muhammad Hatta informed the British that his government was closely studying the Vietnamese question. In fact, Indonesia came surprisingly close to recognizing the DRV diplomatically on anticolonial grounds. In early June, a motion to recognize the DRV came before the Indonesian parliament. Dr. Sakirman of the Partai Sosialis had submitted this motion. The House had already debated it; a vote on it was imminent. The Sakirman motion was very anti-colonialist, something which made it hard for any nationalist leader, including Hatta, to oppose. But Hatta did not want to take sides over Vietnam, agreeing with Jawaharlal Nehru that behind this choice between two Vietnam’s lay the seeds of a major conflict. To avoid recognizing the DRV, the government enlisted Mr. Natsir, a member of the Muslim Masjumi party, to submit a watered-down counter motion, stopping short of diplomatic recognition but still sufficiently anti-colonialist in tone and content. Mr. Natsir’s motion urged the government to study the Vietnam question in greater detail before extending recognition. “We have to bring the Viet Minh question”, Natsir said, “on to an international level”, arguing that the “Viet Minh’s struggle for freedom runs parallel with Indonesia’s struggle, but if we support the Viet Minh’s struggle we must give such assistance as will benefit the Viet Minh without weakening Indonesia’s positions”. When the debate resumed, the Socialists continued to push for diplomatic recognition of the DRV as part of the fight against imperialism. They insisted that Indonesia should not allow its foreign policy to be dictated by foreign loan conditions and Western pressure. In the end, both motions were presented together, with each member being left the right to vote for the motion of his or her choice. To the relief of the Hatta government, to say nothing of the Americans, British, and French, the Natsir motion won over the Sakirman one by a vote of 49 to 38. The question of Indonesian diplomatic recognition of the DRV was thus shelved for the time being, and a potential crisis in Indonesian-American relations averted. See also CIVIL WAR; VIETNAMESE NATIONALIST PARTY.