Following the Japanese overthrow of the French in Indochina on 9 March 1945, the northern Vietnamese colonial city of Haiphong fell under Japanese control before being transferred to the nationalist control of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) upon the Japanese defeat in August 1945. On 6 March 1946, French forces established a military presence there in line with the Franco-Chinese Accord and that of the Accords of 6 March 1946. The DRV continued to administer the port, its taxes and duties, as part of what it considered to be its territorial sovereignty. The French contested this nationalist interpretation on colonial grounds, but were prevented from doing anything about it as long as the Chinese republican troops occupying Vietnam north of the 16th parallel remained there. With the withdrawal of the last remaining Chinese troops by 18 September 1946, local French authorities in Indochina led by High Commissioner Georges Thierry d’Argenlieu pushed a more aggressive line towards the DRV, rolling back its authority in order to advance the restoration of colonial sovereignty. As long as a negotiated settlement remained elusive, a clash between the French and the Viet Minh always remained a real possibility. And that it is what happened in the strategically important northern Vietnamese port of Haiphong when the question arose as to who exercised control of customs there.
The “Haiphong incident” began on 20 November 1946, when French officials challenged the jurisdiction of the DRV’s port authorities to intercept a Chinese junk carrying petrol in the harbor. When the French began to unload the cargo, Vietnamese customs officials, soldiers, and police intervened to stop them on the grounds that this was a sovereign DRV matter – and not a colonial or federal one. While the French and Vietnamese versions diverge from this point as to who escalated this local incident into a violent clash two days later, at the heart of the matter was again a contested interpretation of sovereignty. Admiral Georges Thierry d’Argenlieu and his allies on the ground, especially Colonel Jean Debès, had no desire to negotiate the question. When a French vehicle came under fire in Haiphong, Debès used this as a pretext to advance French control of the entire city of Haiphong. Ho Chi Minh did not want to risk escalating the incident into a causis belli, knowing full well that the DRV was not yet in a position to take on the French militarily.
Debès’s superior, General Louis Morlière, opposed his subordinate’s aggressive line in Haiphong and rushed a liaison team to calm things down. A cease-fire agreement was signed on 21 November 1946. However, when General Jean Valluy, Morlière’s own superior and an ally of Thierry d’Argenlieu, learned of it, he instructed Debès as follows: “The time has come to teach a harsh lesson to those who attacked us like traitors. By all the means at your disposal, you are to take complete control of Haiphong and bring the Vietnamese government and army to recognize its error”. Paris was informed of the situation, but indecision allowed these local officials to transform the incident into something tipping dangerously close to war above the 16th parallel. On 22 November Morlière caved in, although he warned Valluy that such action would destroy the Accords of 6 March and make full-scale war with the DRV almost inevitable.
Valluy ordered Debès to administer the “lesson”. Debès delivered an ultimatum to the Vietnamese on 23 November, demanding that they turn over control of the city. Debès only left his Vietnamese interlocutors three hours in which to respond. When he failed to receive an answer, he began a general attack on the city, using heavy artillery provided by French warships anchored in the harbor. While the DRV had already evacuated most of the civilians, many remained and were often indistinguishable from local militia forces. Others perished while fleeing to nearby Kien An. Paul Mus, citing French Vice Admiral Robert Battet, claimed that 6,000 people died that day. However, as far as we know, Battet was not there at the time. American Vice Consul James O’Sullivan, relying on an interview with the French chief of the Deuxième Bureau, estimated deaths to range between 1,500 and 2,000. Léon Pignon, one of Thierry d’Argenlieu’s supporters, claimed that the number killed in the Haiphong battle numbered “certainly in the thousands” (se chiffrent certainement par milliers). Whatever the precise number of casualties, the French attack on the city was brutal. Even Jean Sainteny described Debès’s attack as “very brilliant but also very brutal”.
It remains unclear who was at fault for the initial escalation following the French seizure of the Chinese vessel on 20 November. What is sure is that the wider historical battle over national versus colonial sovereignty was the principle cause of this break and adumbrated the violent rupture between the two sides a month later in Hanoi. What is also clear is that the French, especially Valluy and Debès, were responsible for breaking the cease-fire in order to transform a local incident into a major military action costing the lives of thousands of Vietnamese and effectively putting the DRV’s back against the wall. More than anything else, the violent conquest of Haiphong convinced DRV leaders that they had to prepare for war. Stein Tonnesson makes the point that the Haiphong incident must also be understood in the context of Thierry d’Argenlieu’s decision to adopt a more aggressive line towards the DRV in the north following Dr. Nguyen Van Thinh’s suicide in the south on 10 November. Paris, however, had never approved this shift in policy. See also 23 SEPTEMBER 1945; 19 DECEMBER 1946; MASSACRES.