Having inflicted a severe defeat upon the forces of the French Union in the uplands of Cao Bang, General Vo Nguyen Giap was convinced that he could repeat his feat in the Red River Delta. It was said that the commanding general had even promised his troops that they would be in Hanoi before the lunar New Year in February 1951. With the battle of Trung Hung Dao, as the Vietnamese christened this operation, the General Counter Offensive was underway and the days of the pure guerrilla were fading. However, not unlike Nguyen Binh in the south, Vo Nguyen Giap badly underestimated the enemy’s strength in the deltas. Thanks to their intelligence services, the French were well aware of the adversary’s intentions to attack at Vinh Yen. And the new French high commander, General Jean de Lattre de Tassigny, was also spoiling for a fight, especially in the Red River Delta. Between 12 and 17 January 1951, Vo Nguyen Giap began the attack at Luc Nam and on the road to Vinh Yen, committing regiments of the 308^th division to the battle. This was the first time the Vietnamese had engaged in battle in the open field, applying wave tactics they had learned from the Chinese. Against such attacks, de Lattre let loose his artillery and air power, ordering the use of napalm against attacking troops. The French scored a resounding victory over the Vietnamese at Vinh Yen. Somewhere between 1,200 and 1,600 Vietnamese were killed during the battle. The French victory increased the confidence of the Expeditionary Corps after the loss at Cao Bang. De Lattre, it was thought, would indeed turn things around. For the Vietnamese, it was clear that victory would not be immediate, that the General Counter Offensive could not be applied so easily, nor the abandonment of the guerrilla war. General Vo Nguyen Giap also realized that wave tactics in the deltas, against superior French airpower and artillery, could be a recipe for disaster. See also DIEN BIEN PHU, BATTLE OF; NA SAN, BATTLE OF; WAVE TACTICS.